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McD.: Evidence--Res Gestae--Spontaneous Declarations
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
EVIDENCE-RES

GESTAE-SPoNTANEOuS

DECLAEATIONS.-D

was

indicted for the murder of his father, tried, and found guilty of
voluntaiy manslaughter. At the trial, a witness was permitted to
testify to statements made by decedent, some thirty to fifty minutes
after the alleged assault, naming D as his assailant. D objected to
the admissibility of this testimony on the ground that it was hearsay
and pursued this objection by writ of error to the Supreme Court
of Appeals of Virginia. Held, that the statement made by decedent
some thirty to fifty minutes after the alleged assault was not contemporaneous with the alleged assault and was not a spontaneous
utterance at the time of the assault; that the statement was a narrative of a past, completed occurrence and was not admissible as
part of the res gestae. Kuckenbecker v. Commonwealth, 101 S.E.2d
523 (Va. 1958).
The basis for admission of extrajudicial statements as part of
the res gestae is that the stress and excitement of the thing being
done provokes a declaration, relating to that event, with such
spontaneity that reflection upon which falsehood is based is precluded. Reynolds v. W. T. Grant Co., 117 W. Va. 615, 186 S.E.
603 (1986); 7 MicMM's JUMISPRUDENCE OF VIMGINIA AND WEST VMGiNuIA, Evidence § 259 (1949). Thus it must appear that the statement is not a mere narrative of a past completed event or made
with deliberation or reflection upon the past event. State v. Barker,
128 W. Va. 744, 38 S.E.2d 346 (1946); 6 WMoRE, EVMENCE § 1750
(3d ed. 1940).
Though the statement need not be strictly contemporaneous
with the exciting cause, it must be made within such time after
and under such circumstances as will exclude the presumption that
it is a result of deliberation. State v. Baker, 84 W. Va. 151, 99 S.E.
252 (1919). Since the veracity of the statement is attributed to the
preclusion of reflection, spontaneity rather than contemporaneity is
now the generally recognized test of admissibility. Collins v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 122 W. Va. 171, 8 S.E.2d 825 (1940); Starcher v.
South Penn Oil Co., 81 W. Va. 587, 95 S.E. 28 (1918). While the
mere passage of time will not, in the presence of circumstances indicating otherwise, deprive the statement of its spontaneity, an
indefinite showing of the time element may, in the absence of circumstances indicating otherwise, be controlling in determining that
the statement is not part of the res gestae. See e.g., State v. Hicks,
107 W. Va. 418, 148 S.E. 131 (1929); State v. Johnson, 107 W. Va.
216, 148 S.E. 4 (1929).
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The presence or absence of facts, in particular cases, which
tend to exclude the presumption of deliberation may to some extent
account for the different results reached in cases where the time
element was the same and to that extent resolve many of the apparent conflicting decisions. State v. Withrow, 96 S.E.2d 913 (W. Va.
1957). The mental and physical condition of the declarant is an
important, if not controlling, consideration in determining whether
a lapse of time has deprived the statement of its spontaneity. See
State v. Withrow, supra; State v. Hicks, supra. The time element
involved in a particular case cannot be disassociated from the other
elements involved therein. So it is that no fixed time can be associated with the rule and the factual situation in each case will set
a time limit peculiar only to that particular set of facts. State v.
Coram,supra; 20 Am. JIR., Evidence § 668 (1989).
In the principal case the time of the alleged assault is not
precisely fixed. Decedent, when discovered by the witness, was
pale, breathing hard, and holding his hand on his chest. Decedent
accompanied the witness into the lobby of the hotel and, after
having conversed with the witness for a few minutes, made his
statement of the alleged assault in response to an inquiry by the
witness.
That the court was correct in holding that decedent's statement
lacked the spontaneity required for its admission as part of the res
gestae seems of little doubt. Though there is some evidence that
decedent may have been experiencing pain resulting from the alleged
assault at the time he made his statement, the failure to mention
the assault immediately upon meeting the witness, the ability to
carry on an intelligent conversation for a few minutes before making
the statement, and the fact that the statement was made in response
to a question by the witness are strong factors indicating that
decedent's statement was not prompted by a spontaneous emotional
reaction to the alleged assault; but that he was speaking with a
deliberated calmness of a past completed event. These factors, considered in light of the fact that the statement was made within an
indefinite period, some thirty to fifty minutes, after the alleged
assault, appear to conclusively overcome any evidence presented
to show that decedent continued to act under the stress and excitement caused by the alleged assault.
The statement and application of the res gestae rule by the
West Virginia court has led to some confusion and apparent con-
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flicting decisions. However, it is suggested that an analysis of the
individual cases in light of all their individual facts may serve to
clarify and perhaps resolve many of the apparent conflicts. See
Hardman, Spontaneous Declarations (Res Gestae), 54 W. VA. L.
REv. 93 (1952), 56 W. VA. L. REv. 1 (1954).

It is submitted that our court, on the facts here present, would
reach the same decision as did the Virginia court in the principal
case.
J. D. McD.

LANDLORD AND TENANT -

CONDEMNATION -

TERmINATION OF

the owner of a lot with a store building thereon, leased
the premises to D for a two year term for the purpose of operating
a business. The state highway department, desiring to widen the
highway, condemned a major portion of the leased premises, including the part on which the store building was located. Both P and D
were made parties to condemnation proceedings and were awarded
damages for their respective interests. P offered to relocate the
store building and continue the lease. Upon D's refusal to continue
the lease P brought this action for nonpayment of the rent. Held,
that condemnation of the major portion of the leased premises
terminated the lease, and with it reciprocal rights and obligations
of the parties under such lease, including the landlord's right to
rent. Affirmed. Farr v. Williams, 101 S.E.2d 483 (S.C. 1957).
LEASE.-P,

It is surprising that a question of such practical importance as
whether the appropriation of leased premises through eminent
domain abates the payment of rent, should not have been definitely
settled.
According to a majority of decisions, the taking of the entire
premises by condemnation proceedings operates to release the
tenant from liability to pay rent. See, e.g., Chrysoverges v. General Cigar Co., 163 La. 364, 111 So. 787 (1927); Newark v. Cook,
99 N.J. Eq. 527, 133 Ad. 875 (1926). There are perhaps only two
decisions to the effect that it is no defense to the claim for rent
that the whole premises have been taken for public use, it being
considered that the covenant to pay rent remains operative in spite
of the fact that the lessee no longer has any interest in the land.
Foote v. Cincinnati,11 Ohio 408 (1842); Foltz v. Huntley, 7 Wend.
210 (N.Y. 1831).
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